OPINION: Bound to Fail? President Boakai’s Anti-Corruption Crusade and the Tragedy of a Two-Tier System of Accountability

MONROVIA, LIBERIA- “A civilization that proves incapable of solving the problems it creates is a decadent civilization. A civilization that chooses to close its eyes to its most crucial problems is a stricken civilization. A civilization that uses its principles for trickery and deceit is a dying civilization.” Aimé Césaire

When Joseph N. Boakai assumed the presidency following a rather contentious presidential election, Liberians from different sections of society became enveloped with optimism about the prospect of their future and imagined a new direction for the country. While in the opposition, candidate Boakai promised the Liberian people a fresh start, pledging to fight the wicked problem of corruption and impunity, which has kept the people in the gutters of underdevelopment. This pledge drummed up support for the then-candidate Boakai and generated enormous enthusiasm in marginalized groups of the population, which partly explained his triumph in an election in which his party was both cash-strapped and written off by the most powerful stratum of the Liberian political elite. Many Liberians, in different ways, have complained about the spiral of decline that has gripped the country for decades. This angst about national decline identifies official corruption as one of the main factors, if not the main one, fuelling socio-economic backwardness and widespread underdevelopment.

Asset Recovery Fiasco

Like his two predecessors before him, Boakai began his presidency on a high note, placing the fight against corruption at the nerve centre of his administration, promising to come out swinging in retrieving Liberia’s stolen assets from officials of the erstwhile regime, a pronouncement that coincided with the public mood and generated huge commendations for the government from various quarters of the population. The first indication was the establishment of an asset-recovery committee. However, the move, underlined by good intentions, could not live up to the expectations of the Liberian public because of the lack of proper reflections that attended the appointment of members of the committee. As if tailor-made to bungle the responsibilities assigned to them, the committee embarked on its tasks with neither a strategic plan outlining how it would approach the fight nor did it engage in proper planning. This was the first sign that the committee was neither fit for purpose nor could it deliver on the enormous tasks assigned to it. Like a group of teenagers hyper-excited about the summer holidays, the committee went on to execute the confiscation of properties without following proper judicial procedures. It is because of this that the committee has faced legal humiliation and repudiation at the Liberian Supreme Court in the case filed against it by Finda Bundooo, former Chief-of-Protocol and owner of the Gracious Ride Transport Service.

Since then, the committee has been embroiled in one scandal after another, leading to the resignation of one key figure, particularly Comrade Martin K. N. Kollie, who has been at the forefront of the anti-corruption crusade and the fight for social justice in the Republic. In his well-written but lengthy resignation letter, Comrade Kollie outlined a litany of allegations against the boss of that asset recovery committee of infamy, bordering on personal corruption, fraud, incompetence, and his inability to promote esprit de corps in the ranks of the committee—allegations that should make the position of the chairperson untenable. As if that was not the final straw to break the back of the camel, accusations about the chairperson entering Faustian pacts with individuals who have state assets in exchange for not pursuing them would proliferate media spaces, generating further cynicism among the Liberian public.

All this points to the folly of asset recovery—a war that should have been won to give people hope and set a significant example—a battle that could have recorded landmark success for the new administration in its early days. The task, if executed brilliantly, could have provided important reassurances to the population, allowing the president to tackle more structural afflictions at the level of the economy. Despite attempts to embellish this epic failure, the asset recovery war has been lost, at least for the foreseeable future. Thus the entire process has become a giant joke and fiasco. While the intention to retrieve assets has been right, the underlying thinking required to set up such a committee has been tragically misguided and utterly flawed, which explains the opposite outcomes: the lack of success, judicial humiliation, and mockery it has turned out to be even by dubious Liberian standards. If the notion that a good leader is a good judge of human character is the framework through which one deciphers and analyzes a leader’s actions, then on this one, President Boakai has displayed remarkable incompetence.

In all honesty, President Boakai had all the time in the world to enlist some of Liberia’s best and brightest minds, including dynamic sons and daughters who have proven to be incorruptible, nationalistic, and surprisingly ethical. However, he selected a conman and seasoned crook whose rise to national stardom was because of public empathy about the questionable circumstances that occasioned his relief from his job by the Weah regime. Tragically, the president settled on a third-rate legal mediocrity whose rise up the legal pyramid has nothing to do with his competence and integrity, but everything to do with his criminal association with the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) and a legal profession susceptible to bribery and dark acts.

However, casting a wider light on this issue, two things readily come to mind: President Boakai's seriousness in fighting corruption, which, given his experience in government, he would be aware of the pushback from the cabal that has sucked off the economic lifeblood of the republic for decades. The second question borders on good political judgment–a sine qua non for political leadership, especially in third-world countries where institutions are broken and the president wields outsized power. On these two important fronts, the Liberian leader is found wanting, which leaves one to shudder with horror and wonder whether he is up to the task of leading the Republic into a glorious future.

GAC Audits

While the asset recovery fight has taken a nosedive, the General Auditing Commission (GAC) embarked on audits of key government functionaries, including the Central Bank of Liberia (CBL) and the Liberia Telecommunication Authority (LTA), to understand the financial records of these institutions and to ascertain whether the systems they use are fit for purpose. Speaking in generalities, the audit reports have highlighted systemic failures and the lousy processes and procedures for financial management—all of which have made one wonder about all the hype that characterized the integrated financial management and the Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program? Were they not meant to establish systems to end some of these glaring abuses in the public sector? What happened to the digitalization of financial management in government ministries and agencies? Every so often, when audits are conducted, this question of systemic failure, procedural or otherwise, writs large in the reports as if there have not been numerous attempts to correct the sad state of the public financial management system.

Apart from the systemic issues, the audit reports, particularly of the Central Bank, revealed a very reckless pattern of financial abuse, with which, based on media reportage, we have been all too familiar: That George Weah and his collection of political charlatans and imbeciles ran a ring of criminality and racket at the CBL, which transformed the CBL from the Bank of last resort to a financial black hole conditioned to satisfy the worst cravings of the likes of George Weah, Samuel Tweah, Jefferson Koijee, and Nathaniel Mcgill, with Aloycious Tarlue and Nyemadi Pearson being the conduits of such wanton despoliation of the public treasury. Like most reports of the GAC, the one on the CBL has thrown up the question of criminal culpability, especially of elements at the very echelons of the bank during the decadent Weah years.

Two-Tier System

Notwithstanding concerns about the process, it is on the issue of individual criminal culpability that one has observed the snowballing of the fight against corruption into the two-tier system of accountability, where one rule applies to those who enjoy special protection due to proximity to various centres of power in the administration and another to those who do not have such special privilege. This dichotomy lends ample credence and reinforces the argument about witch hunting: selective targeting, selective prosecution, and unequal and discriminatory application of the law. If care is not taken, this might ruin the drive to promote transparency in the public sphere, and this dangerous trend has been noticeable in two recent cases. The first case is the one involving Mamaka Bility and Sylvester M. Grigsgby, two super ministers joined together in a special relationship who have been embroiled in a series of scandals, including the so-called “yellow machine gate,” where the president has unsurprisingly provided cover for them.

The second involves Nyemadi Pearson, the now disgraced deputy governor of the CBL, who was implicated in the damning audit report of the GAC on the CBL, and whose apologists are fond of citing the doctrine of respondeat superior, a fixture of tort law not applicable in the current matter, to excuse her wrongful acts. While Tarlue, the Central Bank Governor, has been suspended and is likely to be arraigned before the court to answer criminal charges regarding the racket he and his cohorts on the Board of Governors of the CBL under Weah unleashed, Madame Pearson has been let off the hook, given special treatment, and being wined and dined by leading figures in the current administration, including by the |Liberian leader. The difference in treatment between Tarlue and Pearson mirrors the difference in executive connections and special privileges. This was markedly observable in Ms. Pearson’s resignation letter, where she requested financial compensation for her unexpired tenure, alluding to some meetings with higher-ups in the government.

Undoubtedly, based on these two significant examples and many not stated, there are factual and reasonable grounds to believe that there is an emerging two-tier system of accountability. Although this trend is not new, it points to wider problems that plague the fight. It also revealed that the same forces that derailed previous attempts at fighting corruption are at their dirty tricks again and underscored the lack of decisive actions on the part of the president. However, more worryingly, the patron-client relationship, which has been one of the ravaging viruses at the heart of public service, is observable, as is the lack of political will on the part of the president. When contesting to become the Liberian leader, many critics of President Boakai pointed out that he was too old and frail to provide the kind of decisive leadership required to move the needle on fundamental issues relating to nation-building. Some even argued that he was a colourless bureaucrat who lacked the depth of a progressive leader and the decisiveness required of a leader.

For the fight against corruption to succeed, it has to be impartial; national laws must be seen as objective, applying across the board regardless of who is involved or suspected. Equality and non-discrimination, a fashionable legal principle, must be the guiding light of the crusade. This is against the backdrop that in any process where otherization trumps the fair application of laws, rules, and standards that inform decision-making, there is a tendency for it to ratchet up public anger and rumblings of resentment. Numerous examples abound in the Liberian context and in other jurisdictions. The negative consequence is that bad faith actors and political opportunists would exploit this apparent loophole to sow chaos and cause confusion, leading to political cleavages, as we have seen in the actions orchestrated by the Congress for Democratic Change.

By Alfred P. B. Kiadii. Kiadii is a Liberian political, human rights, and environmental activist. He writes on the issues of current affairs, international politics, human rights, and environmental justice. He could be reached at [email protected].